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THE SHARING STICK
IN THE PROPERTY RIGHTS BUNDLE:
THE CASE OF SHORT TERM RENTALS & HOAS
Donald J. Kochan*

Abstract
Property owners are now more than ever
exercising the “sharing stick” in their
metaphorical bundle of property rights. This
Article examines the right to share one’s property
with others as a branch, stemming from the
inclusion stick, that itself grows out of the exclusion
right held by property owners, along with the legal
consequences of that characterization.

The right to share, like other rights, can be given
up when an owner joins a common interest
community (CIC). However, when owners enter
CICs and agree to governance by a homeowner
association (HOA), they retain whatever residual
parts of their ownership bundle they do not give up.
Recent CIC and HOA cases examined in this
Article illuminate the existence of a “right to
share,” where the default rule is that owners of
real property have the right to engage in short term
rentals unless they have expressly alienated that
right through some private agreement. It will only
be abrogated upon identifiable language in the
initial CIC agreement making such diminishment of
the right possible.
The issues in several recent cases discussed here,
regarding whether HOAs can create or enforce
rules through their covenants, conditions, and
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Chapman University School of Law. J.D., Cornell Law School, 1998; B.A. Western Michigan
University, 1995. This Article evolved from my remarks titled “Traditional Property Principles
Confronting a Changing World: Selected Recent Case Developments,” delivered on the “Professors
Panel” at the American Bar Association’s Real Property, Trusts, & Estates (RPTE) Law Section Annual
Spring Symposium in Denver, Colorado, on April 21, 2017. I thank Wilson Freyermuth for organizing
that panel and for the invitation to participate, as well as for offering comments on the Article. I also
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restrictions (CC&Rs) that prohibit short term
rentals, are in essence asking whether the
association and community are empowered to limit
the sharing stick in the bundle. The primary
questions discussed relate to whether, when, and
how an association can impose limitations or
prohibitions on short term rentals under existing
authorities where such express substantive
authority is not clearly, expressly given, and when
the CIC must instead seek to undertake
extraordinary measures like amendment to a CIC’s
declaration in order to empower an HOA to so
limit where it could not before. This Article
concludes that the judicial interpretation of scope
of CIC and HOA authority in relation to short term
rentals demonstrates the strength of the sharing
right. However, these cases also reveal that this
sharing right may be consensually limited if the
initial CIC declaration or valid subsequent
amendments grant the proper HOA authority to do
so.
I. INTRODUCTION
Short term rentals (STRs) of dwelling units—while not an entirely
new phenomena—have “exploded” in popularity with the rise of the
“sharing economy,” the emergence of companies facilitating such
rentals like Airbnb and HomeAway, and the development of the entire
infrastructure and technological assistance that lowers transactions costs
associated with such arrangements.1 Property owners are exercising the
“sharing stick” in their property rights bundle now more than ever. Not
1. The Washington Post Editorial Board opined on the trend in early 2017:
Home-sharing services such as Airbnb have exploded over the past few years,
which is good. Travelers get more options — both in terms of price and location
— and property owners can make money on spare rooms or on their apartments
while they are away. With some basic regulations, meanwhile, cities can become
more attractive to visitors and collect hotel tax revenues. Win-win-win.
See, e.g., Editorial, The District’s Airbnb Bill is Too Restrictive, WASH. POST, (Feb. 4, 2017) at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-districts-airbnb-bill-is-toorestrictive/2017/02/04/556c1d66-e993-11e6-80c2-30e57e57e05d_story.html?utm_term=.96c022aeb3eb;
see also Shelly Kreiczer-Levy, Consumption Property in the Sharing Economy, 43 PEPP. L. REV. 61, 63
(2016) (“a new economic phenomenon is gradually changing the rules of the game. The sharing
economy has taken the media, social networks, and public discourse by storm.”); The Rise of the
Sharing Economy: On the Internet, Everything is for Hire, ECONOMIST (Mar. 9, 2013),
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21573104-internet-everything-hire-rise-sharing-economy.
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surprisingly, the increased adaptation of residential properties into units
available for short term stays by strangers, with occupancy that is more
dynamic, has generated controversy—including because neighbors are
not always happy with what they see as a disruptive transformation of a
previously more stable community due to a rise in transient occupancy.2
While debates over how to handle or potentially regulate such
disruption are occurring generally within communities of all types, the
use of short term rentals inside common interest communities (CICs)
with homeowners associations (HOAs) raise particularly interesting
legal issues. CICs and HOAs are designed to create governance rules
and mechanisms that appeal to some purchasers. Individuals wishing to
receive the benefits of these structures can buy into the CIC as offered
by developers, accepting restrictions on their autonomy in the process.
The combined collective of purchasers with common preferences that
buy in can thereby enter into private agreements with enforceable
mandates—enforced primarily through “declarations” and associated
covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CC&Rs).3
New battles are brewing within CICs where some owners wish to
take advantage of their rights to offer their homes for short term rentals
while other community members see negative externalities from such
rights that they wish to curtail. Among the questions raised in such
clashes are three of particular interest for this Article. First, do existing
community declarations and rules already prohibit short term rentals
under provisions that limit units to “residential” purposes, “single family
homes,” non-commercial uses, non-transient uses, or the like? Second,
if existing association rules do not yet prohibit short term rentals, may
associations or boards amend the rules to prohibit or otherwise limit
short term rentals? Finally, if associations or boards do not have wide
enough authority to amend ordinary rules to prohibit or otherwise limit
short term rentals, may the bylaws or declaration of the CIC be changed,
following appropriate procedures set out in the community’s governing
documents, to so prohibit or limit such short term rentals? This Article
examines recent case developments that provide some answers to, and
guidance on, these questions.
As explained in later parts of this Article, the cases have shaken out in
a way that supports the existence of a “sharing stick” within the bundle
of sticks representing property rights to which property owners are

2. Kellen Zale, Sharing Property, 87 U. COLO. L. REV. 501, 502-03 (2016) (“The sharing
economy—the rapidly evolving sector of peer-to-peer transactions epitomized by Airbnb and Uber—is
nothing if not controversial.”).
3. ROBERT G. NATELSON, LAW OF PROPERTY OWNERS ASSOCIATIONS §2.4 (1989) (explaining
the role of general declarations, CC&Rs and bylaws); see also generally Uriel Reichman, Residential
Private Governments: An Introductory Survey, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 253 (1976).
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entitled to lay claim. In other words, the case law supports the existence
of a “right to share,” where the default rule is that owners of real
property have the right to engage in short term rentals unless they have
expressly alienated that right through some private agreement. Such
sharing rights, while alienable, are, of course, subject to regulation in the
ordinary course of municipal, state, and federal governance—but these
topics of public land use controls are beyond the scope of this article.4
Part II introduces some basic background on the sharing economy,
including homesharing through short term rentals. Part III explains why
sharing is a stick in a property owner’s bundle of rights, branching off
from the right to include others in the access, use and enjoyment of
one’s property. This characterization of sharing as a right is critical to
understanding how it can be regulated (by private or public governing
structures) and also to how agreements, including declarations in
common interest communities, should be interpreted in relation to the
retained rights of community owners and the rights subject to
community control. Part IV discusses the bargain an owner makes when
agreeing to be governed by common interest community rules. In
particular, Part IV explains the level of acceptable indeterminacy of
rights and assumption of risk when a property owner in a governed
community consents to future changes in the CC&Rs. Part V then
focuses on recent case developments that provide some insight into
when and how common interest communities can prohibit or regulate
short term rentals. Part V also examines the different standards applied
by courts when reviewing changes in rules where the scope of HOA
board authority is more constrained and when reviewing changes
effected by amendment through supermajority procedures where
approval is more liberally granted in the courts. Part V is focused on
examining HOA scope of authority issues, but does not address issues
associated with the next step of concern—how the courts might police
the exercise of that authority through appropriateness, reasonableness, or
business judgment standards. Those issues are left for later work.
This Article concludes that the interpretation of scope of authority
and amendment concerns associated with the short term rental
controversies in the courts demonstrate the strength of the sharing right,
however these cases also reveal that this sharing right may be
consensually limited if the initial CIC declaration or valid subsequent
amendments grant the HOA proper authority to do so. While the
sharing stick is strong, it is alienable. It is, like other rights, capable of
4. See generally, e.g., Stephen R. Miller, First Principles for Regulating the Sharing Economy,
53 HARV. J. LEG. 147 (2016) (providing an overview of regulatory models and theories for the sharing
economy); Erez Aloni, Pluralizing the “Sharing” Economy, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1397 (2016) (building
on insights from pluralistic theory to develop a contextual regulatory model for the sharing economy).
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becoming subject to voluntarily accepted constraints, when an owner
chooses to otherwise take advantage of the perceived benefits of
common interest community living by ceding certain rights.5
II. THE EVOLVING AND EXPANDING SHARING ECONOMY AND SHORT
TERM RENTALS
The concept of sharing—while part of human culture from its
origins—has evolved into a sophisticated and coordinated system of
market engagement.6 Enterprising individuals have identified ways to
feed the sharing spirit. They are responding to the demand for
alternative means of access to property and goods by capitalizing on
new platforms that can facilitate collaborative, access-based
consumption.7 Miller has explained that, because of these new forces,
“[s]haring is no longer an idiosyncratic pursuit; it is now a mainstream
manner of consumption.”8 Although a relatively new phenomenon, the
literature on the sharing economy is already substantial,9 where many
5. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
1519, 1523 n.20 (1982) (“decision to join an association is as voluntary as a human decision can be”).
6. See, e.g., John J. Horton & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Owning, Using and Renting: Some Simple
Economics of the “Sharing Economy,” Harv. Kennedy Sch. Faculty Research Working Paper No. RWP
16-007, Feb. 10, 2016, available at https://research.hks.harvard.edu/publications/getFile.aspx?Id=1307,
at 1 (“In recent years, technology startup firms have created a new kind of rental market, in which
owners sometimes use their assets for personal consumption and sometimes rent them out. Such markets
are referred to as peer-to-peer or ‘sharing economy’ markets.”).
7. See, e.g., Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Regulating Sharing: The Sharing Economy as an Alternative
Capitalist System, 40 TUL. L. REV. 241, 243 (2015) (explaining “collaborative consumption” and “peerto-peer” as alternative labels to describe “the sharing economy”); Shu-Yi Oei & Diane M. Ring, Can
Sharing be Taxed?, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 989, 991 (2016) (“Also known as ‘collaborative
consumption,’ the ‘peer-to-peer economy’ or ‘peer-to-peer consumption,’ a broad range of
commentators suggest that the sharing economy is transforming the way people consume and supply
goods and services, such as transportation, accommodations, and task help.”); Juho Hamari, Mimmi
Sjöklint, & Antti Ukkonen, The Sharing Economy: Why People Participate in Collaborative
Consumption, J. ASS’N. INFO. SCI. & TECH., July 2015, at 2049, available at
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/255698095_The_Sharing_Economy_Why_People_Participate
_in_Collaborative_Consumption (“We define the term CC broadly as the peer-to-peer-based activity of
obtaining, giving, or sharing access to goods and services, coordinated through community-based online
services.”); Miller, supra note 4, at 150 (describing alternative names including “collaborative
consumption” and “access-based consumption”).
8. Miller, supra note 4, at 201.
9. See, e.g., RACHEL BOTSMAN & ROO ROGERS, WHAT’S MINE IS YOURS: THE RISE OF
COLLABORATIVE CONSUMPTION (2010); Nestor M. Davidson & John J. Infranca, The Sharing Economy
as an Urban Phenomenon, 34 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 215 (2016); John Infranca, Intermediary
Institutions and the Sharing Economy, 90 TUL. L. REV. ONLINE 29, 31 (2016); Miller, supra note 4;
Zale, supra note 2, at 502-03 (“The sharing economy—the rapidly evolving sector of peer-to-peer
transactions epitomized by Airbnb and Uber—is nothing if not controversial.”); Jordan M. Barry & Paul
L. Caron, Tax Regulation, Transportation Innovation, and the Sharing Economy, 82 U. CHI. L. REV.
DIALOGUE 69, 70 (2015); Dyal-Chand, Regulating Sharing, supra note 7; Christopher Koopman,
Matthew Mitchell & Adam Thierer, The Sharing Economy and Consumer Protection Regulation: The
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articles have provided comprehensive summaries and analyses generally
of various and diverse sharing markets. As such, this Article will only
briefly sketch the homesharing and short term rental market to provide
context for our later discussion on the existence of a sharing stick in the
bundle of property rights and our analysis of homeowner association
reactions to homesharing.10
“Sharing” as used in the “sharing economy” generally means that
assets or services—like one’s home in the homesharing and short term
rentals markets—are allowed to be accessed, possessed, used or
consumed by someone other than the property owner (or, in other
contexts, the provider of the services).11 The rationale underlying the
efficiencies of sharing for property owners, consumers, and the overall
market rests on the idea of tapping underutilized resources and making
them accessible to be used. Koopman et al., posit, “It is helpful to think
of the sharing economy as any marketplace that brings together
distributed networks of individuals to share or exchange otherwise
underutilized assets.”12 Sharers are owners with assets that have become
capable of economically being monetized with the aid of technology13
and sharees have found new products being marketed to them that were
unavailable before or, if available, at higher prices and with less
choice.14
Case for Policy Change, 8 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 529, 530-31 (2015); Kreiczer-Levy, supra
note 1; Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Sharing the Cathedral, 46 CONN. L. REV. 647 (2013); Aloni, supra note 4.
10. For a good primer on homesharing, see Georgios Zervas, David Proserpio, & John W. Byers,
The Rise of the Sharing Economy: Estimating the Impact of Airbnb on the Hotel Industry, B.U. Sch.
Mgmt. Research Paper No. 2013-16, last revised Nov. 18, 2016, at 2 available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2366898 (for example, reporting Airbnb as having an estimated valuation at
over $30 billion).
11. As I have summarized elsewhere:
[P]roperty that is shared in this sector is used or accessed rather than owned[;] the
transfer of possession to facilitate such use or access is temporary rather than
permanent and involves something less than granting an ownership share[;] . . .
the sharer retains ownership the entire time and has an enforceable expectation for
a return of any property and the cessation of use at a pre-determined future point
in time.
Donald J. Kochan, I Share, Therefore It’s Mine, 51 U. RICH. L. REV. 909, 931 (2017); see also Rachel
Botsman, The Sharing Economy Lacks a Shared Definition, FAST COMPANY (Nov. 21, 2013),
http://www.fastcoexist.com/3022028/the-sharing-economy-lacks-a-shareddefinition (describing the
sharing economy as an “economic model based on sharing underutilized assets . . . for monetary or nonmonetary benefits.”).
12. Koopman et al., supra note 9, at 531.
13. Kreiczer-Levy, Consumption Property, supra note 1, at 76 (“From the owner’s perspective,
there are certain types of goods that have excess capacity when they are privately owned and consumed.
Because the excess capacity is not used, certain types of goods are systematically underexploited.”
(emphasis added)).
14. Dyal-Chand, Regulating Sharing, supra note 7, at 253-54 (“In the areas of home and car
sharing . . . individuals also share the excess capacity of assets that they do not fully use or need for
themselves with strangers—for a price.”).
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“Property sharing,” according to Professor Zale, includes
homesharing and occurs “when property owned or possessed by Party A
is temporarily used or accessed by Party B (either exclusively or
simultaneously with A), with ownership or possession returning to Party
A after an agreed-upon period of time.”15 Property sharing is only one
category of sharing evolving in the present marketplace and thereby
“makes up only part of the overall sharing economy.”16 In previous
work, I have proposed the following definition for “sharing” in the
sharing economy, which is particularly sensitive to the ideas that (1)
property owners are sharing things they own, (2) are doing so precisely
because they have the power to do so as owners, because (3) they own a
sharing stick in their bundle of property rights:
Sharing of a good or real property exists when Owner (O)
exercises her right to include by authorizing a Stranger to the
property (S) the temporary right to use or access O’s property in
some limited and defined manner—converting what would have
been a trespassory act by S into a legal, non-trespassory act—
where such authorization is revocable by O in property law but
where liability may exist in contract for any such revocation or
interference by O in the rights or authority granted by O to S.17
Because one owns what they share, sharing and non-sharing are
available choices. When an owner chooses to share with another—i.e.,
exercises their right to include another in the access and benefits of her
property—she may also then set the terms of the inclusion and charge
for the benefits, as property owners do when they engage in short term
rentals for homesharing.
The reason we have seen the rise of Airbnb, HomeAway, VRBO, and
other homesharing platforms—not to mention the platforms for sharing
other types of property, goods, and services—is not just demand, it is
also the advent of technological capacity that has only recently
materialized to create the necessary market infrastructure, complete with
reliability and security measures, necessary to make such sharing
efficient.18 As lower-cost, higher reliability mechanisms for making
sharing more accessible and more profitable improve, expansion of
15. Zale, supra note 2, at 511-12.
16. Id. at 512.
17. Kochan, supra note 11, at 947.
18. Barry & Caron, supra note 9, at 70-71 (2015); see also Kreiczer-Levy, Consumption
Property, supra note 1, at 77 (discussing how “new technologies and online markets have significantly
lowered transaction costs for short term use of personal assets”); The Rise of the Sharing Economy,
supra note 1 (“technology has reduced transaction costs, making sharing assets cheaper and easier than
ever—and therefore possible on a much larger scale”).
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sharing activity follows. Professor Lee explains that new “[t]echnology
has enabled innovative forms of exchange to emerge, spanning an everbroader range of products and services.”19 Making connections between
suppliers of shared products and consumers is cheaper and easier
because of information technology.20 Internet-based social networking
capabilities and popularity also take some of the risk out of contracting
with strangers. Trust- and reputation-networks that create monitoring,
verification, and quality-control mechanisms are key management tools
that make using sharing platforms attractive and less dangerous.21
Reliable monitoring and rating systems simply could not exist at the
scale now available without the development of the information
technology and internet networking capabilities brought to us by
technological innovation. These systems generate confidence for
consumers and for suppliers, each made more comfortable entering
these sharing arrangements because they know accountability and
reputational rating systems are available to assist their decisionmaking
and deter bad behavior.22 A story in The Economist articulated it as a
system where “the availability of more data about people and things . . .
allows physical assets to be disaggregated and consumed as services.”23
This technological infrastructure supports the sharing economy because
it provides “the market-thickening coordination mechanisms . . . such as
coordinating on time and geography” previously present only in
physical markets rather than online.24
Homesharing—along with other types—has become a major market
force. Airbnb,25 for example, which was founded only in 2008, already
has reportedly “raised more than $3 billion and secured a $1 billion line
of credit.”26 Upon statements by Airbnb’s chief executive that it could
be ready to go public in 2018, “[i]nvestors have pegged Airbnb’s value
at around $30 billion.”27 That company boasts that it alone has
19. Julia Y. Lee, Trust and Social Commerce, 77 U. PITT. L. REV. 137, 141 (2015).
20. Hamari et al, supra note 7, at 2048 (crediting technological advances as simplifying “sharing
of both physical and nonphysical goods and services”); Oei & Ring, supra note 7, at 991 (“The
technological platforms employed by these startups enable individual producers and consumers to
transact with each other with unprecedented ease.”).
21. Horton & Zeckhauser, supra note 6, at 2, 8 (explaining that the sharing economy businesses
have proliferated in part because of technological advances but also emerging “recommender systems
and reputation systems . . . are central to the function of P2P rental markets.”).
22. Id. at 7 (“key challenge in all markets is facilitating trust among strangers”).
23. The Rise of the Sharing Economy, supra note 1.
24. Horton & Zeckhauser, supra note 6, at 7.
25. AIRBNB, www.airbnb.com (last visited November 25, 2018).
26. Katie Benner, Inside the Hotel Industry’s Plan to Combat Airbnb, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16,
2017), at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/16/technology/inside-the-hotel-industrys-plan-to-combatairbnb.html.
27. Id.
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facilitated about 150 million people staying in the shared homes of
others in more than 191 countries.28 Moreover, Airbnb is just one
company – others such as HomeAway,29 VRBO,30 HomeExchange,31
Love Home Swap,32 and even more local exchange networks like
ParisBestLodge33 offer similar platforms to facilitate homesharing
transactions for short term rentals. While not everyone who uses
homesharing ends up staying at properties within common interest
communities, many have been so located and many more community
property owners and homesharing consumers will want to engage in
short term rentals in HOA-governed properties in the days ahead.
Undoubtedly, some neighbors in those CICs will object. Thus, it is
critical to evaluate why property owners generally have a right to share
(discussed next in Part III) and how those rights are affected when a
property owner purchases within a common interest community and is
thereby subject to its governance rules and amendment structures
(discussed in Parts IV-V).
III. THE RIGHT TO INCLUDE AND THE “SHARING STICK” IN THE PROPERTY
RIGHTS BUNDLE
As I have explained in more detail elsewhere, “the sharing right [is]
an outgrowth of the inclusion right, which itself grows out of the
exclusion right held by property owners.”34 Penner has posited, “The
ability to share one’s things, or let others use them, is fundamental in the
idea of property.”35 If one owns property, then they control access to
it.
A common metaphor for describing the rights associated with
property ownership is as a “bundle of sticks,” with each “stick” in “the
bundle” representing some specific attribute of such ownership.
Guzman provides an excellent description of what it means to have a
stick in the bundle of property rights:
Legal theory divorces the term “property” from the item itself to
instead describe relative rights vis-a-vis that item. “Property” thus
means things one can do with Blackacre (entitlements) including
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
(1996).

Id.
HOMEAWAY, www.homeaway.com (last visited November 25, 2018).
VRBO, www.vrbo.com (last visited November 25, 2018).
HOMEEXCHANGE, www.homeexchange.com (last visited November 25, 2018).
LOVE HOME SWAP, www.lovehomeswap.com (last visited November 25, 2018).
PARIS BEST LODGE, www.parisbestlodge.com (last visited November 25, 2018).
Kochan, supra note 11, at 933.
James E. Penner, The Bundle of Rights Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711, 745
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its use, possession and consumption, as well as enjoying its fruits,
the ability to exclude others from its use, and the ability to transfer
it. Although ownership suggests the assemblage of all such rights
in one person who then totes the full “bundle of sticks,” one may
properly speak of “owning” a lone entitlement or stick . . . Legally,
the right itself is the property.36
Similarly, according to the U.S. Supreme Court, “A common idiom
describes property as a ‘bundle of sticks’—a collection of individual
rights which, in certain combinations, constitute property.”37
The logical existence of the “sharing stick” in the bundle of property
rights emerges once one examines—as this Part will—the right to
exclude and the corollary right to include (and its component sharing
branch).38 Inclusion is one of the rights associated with property
ownership, i.e., one of the sticks in the ownership bundle.39 This Part
explains why the right to include is an essential stick in the property
rights bundle, which includes its own “branch” which I will call the
“sharing stick in the bundle” that represents an equally important,
independent and enforceable property right.
The Supreme Court has regularly given the “right to exclude”
recognition as fundamental to property.40 Property owners have a
36. Katheleen R. Guzman, Give or Take an Acre: Property Norms and the Indian Land
Consolidation Act, 85 IOWA L. REV. 595, 614-15 (2000).
37. United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274 (2002) (citing BENJAMIN CARDOZO, PARADOXES OF
LEGAL SCIENCE 129 (1928) (reprint 2000) and Dickman v. Commissioner, 465 U.S. 330, 336 (1984));
see also generally Jane B. Baron, Rescuing the Bundle-of-Rights Metaphor in Property Law, 82 U. CIN.
L. REV. 57 (2013) (making the case for the utility of the bundle of sticks metaphor for understanding
many of the issues related to property in property law).
38. DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 104 (8th ed. 2014) (discussing exclusion and inclusion as the
“necessary and sufficient conditions of transferability”).
39. Grey’s formulation of the things/bundles debate is illuminative:
Most people, including most specialists in their unprofessional moments, conceive of
property as things that are owned by persons. To own property is to have exclusive
control over something – to be able to use it as one wishes, to sell it, give it away,
leave it idle, or destroy it. Legal restraints on the free use of one’s property are
conceived as departures from an ideal conception of full ownership. By contrast, the
theory of property rights held by the modern specialist . . . fragments the robust
unitary conception of ownership into a more shadowy “bundle of rights.”
Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, NOMOS XXII 69, 69 (1980), reprinted in LIBERTY,
PROPERTY, AND THE LAW: MODERN UNDERSTANDINGS OF LIBERTY AND PROPERTY 291 (Richard A.
Epstein, ed., 2000); see also Thomas Ross, Metaphor and Paradox, 23 GA. L. REV. 1053, 1061 (1989)
(“[t]he bundle metaphor…expresses a special sense of the separability of the various sorts of legally
recognized interests”).
40. See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (“one of the most essential
sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property – the right to exclude others”);
see also College Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 673 (1999)
(“The hallmark of a protected property interest is the right to exclude others.”); Int’l News Serv. v.
Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 246 (1918) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“Property depends upon exclusion
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level of dominion and control that allows them to manage property
rights, including the power to exercise the right to include which is
an extension of the choice to not assert the right to exclude. Kelly
conducted exhaustive research and analysis on the ubiquity of the
right to include within property law, and he concluded, “the ability of
owners to ‘include’ others in their property is a central attribute of
ownership and fundamental to any system of private property.”41
Further, this ability to include makes possible mutually beneficial
exchanges—owners are willing to respond to demand from friends
and strangers alike who are willing to offer something of value as
consideration in exchange for being allowed to access the owner’s
property. In other words, sharing is made possible. Dukeminier et
al. describe this combination as “a relationship among people that
entitles so-called owners to include (that is, permit) or exclude (that
is, deny) use or possession of the owned property by other people.”42
Sharing through short term rentals involves an owner permitting
another—who might often be a stranger—to share with the owner the
benefits that the property has to offer. The owner converts the
stranger’s status from what would be a trespasser into someone with
legal rights to temporary possession and use.
The sharer retains ownership but allows the sharee a privileged use
of the property.
Sharing—including through homesharing
contracts—becomes an extension of the primary rights associated
with one’s ability to use and control the property one owns, including
to grant access and usage rights.43 That is why Dukeminier et al.
conclude that “[t]he two rights [to exclude and to include] are the
necessary and sufficient conditions of transferability.”44
The
inclusion stick and the sharing stick (that offshoots as a branch
stemming from it) empower owners to permit non-owners to access
and use their property, including through mechanisms like short term
rentals.45
by law from interference . . . .”); Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“An essential element of individual property is the legal right to exclude
others from enjoying it.”).
41. Daniel B. Kelly, The Right to Include, 63 EMORY L.J. 857, 859 (2014); see also Donald
Kochan, Property as a Vehicle of Inclusion to Promote Human Sociability, JOTWELL (January 22,
2016) (reviewing Kelly, supra), http://property.jotwell.com/property-as-a-vehicle-of-inclusion-topromote-human-sociability/.
42. DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 104 (8th ed. 2014).
43. Hamari et al., supra note 7, at 2049 (citing Fleura Bardhi & Giana M. Eckhardt, AccessBased Consumption: The Case of Car Sharing, 39(4) J. CONSUMER RES. 882–83 (2012)) (“[a]ccess over
ownership means that users may offer and share their goods and services to other users for a limited
time through peer-to-peer sharing activities, such as renting and lending.”).
44. DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 104 (8th ed. 2014).
45. Kelly, supra note 41, at 871-72.
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Although homeowners give up certain rights and agree to allow their
ownership to be controlled in some ways when entering a common
interest community with governance rules, they retain whatever residual
parts of their ownership bundle they do not give up.46 Thus, it is critical
to have a sound understanding of what is included in the pre-agreement
bundle of rights that would otherwise be available before subjecting
property to a common interest community declaration.
That
understanding will facilitate the calculation of what was subtracted and
what remains.
As will be discussed in more detail in Part V, the litigation over
whether homeowners associations may impose limitations on short term
rentals is validation for the position that inclusion and sharing constitute
default sticks in one’s property ownership bundle. The issues in such
cases, regarding whether homeowners associations can create or enforce
rules through their CC&R’s that prohibit short term rentals, are in
essence asking whether the association and community are empowered
to limit the sharing stick in the bundle.47
Living in a common interest community is all about giving up certain
rights of ownership (i.e. giving up certain sticks, if you will) in order to
gain the benefits of community living.48 Included in those benefits is
the comfort, confidence and security that, while you give up a certain
right to do X, you know that your neighbor has reciprocally given up the
right to do X as well, and furthermore has given you the means to
enforce the obligation as much as the neighbor can do the same.
Presumably, you value more living in a neighborhood where your
neighbor cannot do X than you value your own ability to do X. It is a
matter of valuing reciprocal obligation.
In order to determine what rights an owner gave up and what she
didn’t give up, we need to know the starting package—what was the full
complement of ownership rights before agreeing to live under the
common interest community covenants, conditions, and restrictions.
We look at what the owner has ex ante (or would have if she purchased
a similar lot outside community rule), what autonomy she agreed to
46. See, e.g., Grave de Peralta v. Blackberry Mountain Ass’n, Inc., 726 S.E.2d 789, 792 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2012) (citing and quoting England v. Atkinson, 196 Ga. 181, 184(1), 26 S.E.2d 431 (1943)
(“When it is sought to restrict one in the use of his own private property for any lawful purpose, the
ground for such interference must be clear and indubitable. The word indubitable in its literal sense
means without doubt.”)).
47. See, e.g., Adams v. Kimberley One Townhouse Owner’s Association, Inc., 352 P.3d 492
(2015) (citing cases from multiple jurisdictions dealing with HOA authority to restrict short-term
rentals).
48. Paula Franzese, Common Interest Communities: Standards of Review and Review of
Standards, 3 WASH. U.J.L. & POL’Y 663, 671 (2000) (“Restrictions on use are an integral, essential
aspect of any common interest community, generally regarded as vital to preserving the stable, planned
environment that shared ownership aims to foster.”).
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surrender for the benefits of the community, and what residual rights
were retained.
Thus, before community living, an owner, for example, might have
the right to paint her house whatever color she wishes, might be allowed
to have a pet, and might be allowed to display signs in her windows.
Yet, she may agree to limits on those rights by joining the community
and its governance scheme. She might value not living next to a
neighbor with a pit bull more than she values owning a poodle, might
value not looking at a “Trump for President” sign more than she values
displaying a “Clinton for President” sign, and might value being free
from viewing a florescent pink house out her window more than she
values painting her own house green so she agrees to a brown color
scheme within the community. However, if the community rules say
nothing on these rights and do not authorize the HOA to create rules
related to them, then she has retained those rights and has not consented
to their control by the HOA (other than by generally applicable rules as
to the exercise of rights—like nuisance provisions or assessments for
damages to community property, for example).
The same alienability questions arise with the sharing right. It is
possible for an owner to surrender the sharing stick under a common
interest community agreement just like any other right, but the owner
starts with it inside her bundle absent the agreement or if she were to
buy in a place not requiring submission to association rules. It is an
ingredient in her ownership package until it is not. She may consent to
part with it, but like other rights inherent in ownership, we must
examine the facts to determine whether that sharing stick, which begins
inside the bundle, has been voluntarily been made unassertable and
unexercisable. Unless the sharing stick has been removed from the
owner’s collection of enforceable rights within her ownership bundle
(such as by subjecting her control and use decisions to a collective
governance body by joining an HOA and committing to certain
CC&Rs), such owner has retained the default right to share her property
with others, including through short term rentals.49
IV. SOME BACKGROUND ON THE ASSUMPTION OF RISK OF RIGHTS’
CURTAILMENT BY OWNERS PURCHASING PROPERTY WITHIN COMMON
INTEREST COMMUNITIES
When a common interest community is formed and the initial
declaration and bylaws are created, the scope of initial and possible
49. Grave de Peralta v. Blackberry Mountain Ass’n, Inc., 726 S.E.2d 789, 792 (Ga. Ct. App.
2012) (covenants silent on rentals did not authorize limits on STRs, especially because “restrictions
upon an owner’s use of land must be clearly established” in covenants if such uses are to be precluded).
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future restrictions is identified through sometimes broadly worded
covenants, conditions, and restrictions with delegated rulemaking
authority to the HOA to implement the declaration’s mandate.50 If a rule
can be adopted within the scope of the delegated authority, the HOA is
empowered to create such a rule through what might be called the
ordinary course51—general procedures of HOA board voting, often
requiring simple majority of that HOA representative body, as
contrasted with extraordinary measures requiring voting by all
constituent owners before major changes may be adopted.52
On the latter matters, at the time the common interest community is
formed, it also usually sets forth in its bylaws the manner by which the
general governance declaration can be amended, including expanding or
contracting the scope of HOA authority by altering the substantive
breadth of the covenants, conditions, and restrictions.53 These are often
subject to requirements for votes by a supermajority of property owners
in the community and other procedures that are meant to make such
changes difficult, work to keep the rules relatively stable, and are
designed to generate consensus for change.54 Such amendments change
the HOA board’s authorization to act as an agent of the community.55
Thus, even if an HOA board cannot regulate STRs under the initial
authorization—for example, when it cannot twist CC&Rs limiting
dwellings to residential purposes far enough to find authority to ban
STRs—it might gain that authority after a declaration amendment.56
In either of these situations—by ordinary HOA rulemaking or by CIC
amendment—matters of consent arise regarding whether and how
certain rights will be governed or are governable, both now and in the
future. This Part will briefly explore the consequence of purchasing
property in a CIC subject to its rule structures, including governance
bodies like HOAs.
50. See Franzese, supra note 48, at 672 (“Typically, restrictions are imposed in the community’s
declaration of covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CC&R) (alternatively called the “Declaration of
Condominium”) or by board-passed resolution or decision, usually rendered on a case-by-case basis in
response to a given resident’s application to do something not specifically allowed or proscribed by the
CC&R.”).
51. NATELSON, supra note 3, at §4.1 (discussing association rulemaking powers and their limits)
52. Id. §3.3.2.1 (describing typical supermajority vote requirements for extraordinary actions
while simple majority rule governs ordinary actions).
53. Id. §3.4.2 (describing sources of association powers).
54. Id.
55. Id. §2.5 (“In a subdivision in which the servitudes have created a Property owners
Association, the founders purposes [as identified in the declaration] are central to determining the
association’s proper organization, powers, and duties.”).
56. See, e.g., North Country Properties, LLC v. Lost Acres Homeowners Ass’n of Burnett, 879
N.W.2d 810, ¶¶ 5, 8 (Ct. App. Wisc. 2016) (unpublished) (upholding restriction on short term rentals
after “requisite number of lot owners agreed to and recorded the amendments prohibiting”).
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Property owners choose to enter common interest communities and
are willing to be “governed” and “limited” in their rights to achieve their
preferences to live in a community of ordered rules.57 The voluntariness
of the exercise is key, for individuals need not subject themselves to
such private governance.58 However, property owners are willing to
give up considerable autonomy by joining common interest
communities and subjecting themselves to governance by HOAs in
order to get the benefits of living in such a community. As the
California Supreme Court explained in Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village
Condominium Association, “subordination of individual property rights
to the collective judgment of the owners association together with
restrictions on the use of real property comprise the chief attributes of
owning property in a common interest development.”59 In Hidden
Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Norman,60 a Florida state court captured well
the autonomy/governance tradeoffs involved in common interest
communities. In its oft-cited description, the court discussed the
voluntary relinquishment by homeowners of freedom of choice when
entering into condominium or other common interest communities:
It appears to us that inherent in the condominium concept is the
principle that to promote the health, happiness, and peace of mind
of the majority of the unit owners since they are living in such
close proximity and using facilities in common, each unit owner
must give up a certain degree of freedom of choice which he might
otherwise enjoy in separate, privately owned property.
Condominium unit owners comprise a little democratic sub society
of necessity more restrictive as it pertains to use of condominium
57. See, e.g., Timothy Egan, The Serene Fortress: Many Seek Security in Private Communities,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1995, Sec. 1, at 1 (“The fastest-growing residential communities in the nation are
private and usually gated, governed by a thicket of covenants, codes, and restrictions” where individuals
have “chosen to wall themselves off, opting for private government”).
58. Consider the following description of the balance struck when choosing to voluntarily
subject one’s self and her property to a private governance system:
[A]greement to submit to the decisionmaking authority of a cooperative board is
voluntary in a sense that submission to government authority is not; there is
always the freedom not to purchase the apartment. The stability offered by
community control, through a board, has its own economic and social benefits,
and purchase of a cooperative apartment represents a voluntary choice to cede
certain of the privileges of single ownership to a governing body, often made up
of fellow tenants who volunteer their time, without compensation. The board, in
return, takes on the burden of managing the property for the benefit of the
proprietary lessees.
Levandusky v. One Fifth Ave. Apartment Corp., 75 N.Y.2d 530, 536-37 (N.Y. 1990) (citing Sterling
Vill. Condo., Inc. v. Breitenbach, 251 So. 2d 685, 688 n. 6 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971)).
59. 878 P.2d 1275, 1282 (Cal. 1994).
60. 309 So. 2d 180, 181–82 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) [hereinafter Hidden Harbour I].
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property than may be existent outside the condominium
organization.61
As the court in Nahrstedt also counseled, there are “limitations on
personal autonomy that are inherent in the concept of shared ownership
of residential property” of “common interest developments” that are
accepted by the homeowners when they choose to purchase property
within such communities and agree to be governed by the community’s
private governance system.62 Owners in common interest communities
agree to a diminished level of autonomous control over property uses
even beyond what would otherwise be permitted outside the community
and under public governance rules; they agree to not always wear a
crown claiming to be king of their own castle, understanding that they
may be ruled by others.63
Owners agree to tolerate and pre-consent to interference with what
would otherwise be their property rights.64 The existing restrictions at
the point of agreement and entry into the common interest community,
along with new restrictions within the association or board’s authority to
adopt, are “essentially self-imposed.”65 As one New York state court
put it, “Because of the manner in which ownership in a condominium is
structured, the individual unit owner, in choosing to purchase the unit,
must give up certain of the rights and privileges which traditionally
attend fee ownership of real property and agree to subordinate them to
the group’s interest.”66 This consent usually includes an understanding
that the governing board of the association will have broad powers and
wide latitude to impose restrictions or other rules consistent with its
mandate to advance community interests identified in the association’s
61. Id.; see also Noble v. Murphy, 34 Mass. App. Ct. 452, 455–56 (1993) (citing Kaplan v.
Boudreaux, 410 Mass. 435, 438 (1991); Hidden Harbour I, 309 So.2d at 182 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975))
(“Central to the concept of condominium ownership is the principle that each owner, in exchange for the
benefits of association with other owners, ‘must give up a certain degree of freedom of choice which he
might otherwise enjoy in separate, privately owned property.’”).
62. Nahrstedt, supra note 59.
63. See Sterling Vill. Condo., 251 So. 2d at 688 (“Every man may justly consider his home his
castle and himself as the king thereof; nonetheless his sovereign fiat to use his property as he pleases
must yield, at least in degree, where ownership is in common or cooperation with others.”).
64. Tropicana Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Tropical Condo., LLC, 208 So. 3d 755, 759 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2016) (“Due to the uniqueness of condominium living, condominium associations have a degree of
control over the ownership of units and, concomitantly, individual owners tolerate a degree of intrusion
into their property ownership.”).
65. Franklin v. Spadafora, 388 Mass. 764, 773 (1983) (“Since the plaintiffs’ decisions to
purchase units within the condominium were no doubt voluntary, any restrictions imposed on the
plaintiffs’ right to buy or sell property within the condominium are, for this reason, essentially selfimposed.”).
66. Schoninger v. Yardarm Beach Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., 134 A.D.2d 1, 6 (N.Y. App. Div.
1987).
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bylaws, declaration, or other governing documents.67
Consequently, individual owners are agreeing to a certain amount of
indeterminacy of their rights, which may change as the board, or its
rules, change in reasonably anticipated ways contemplated by the scope
of the initial consent. In fact, “[t]hrough the exercise of this authority, to
which would-be apartment owners must generally acquiesce, a
governing board may significantly restrict the bundle of rights a
property owner normally enjoys.”68 Moreover, courts often favor strict
enforcement of common interest community governance rules—
including the rights in these “private constitutions” to change the rules—
precisely because, while one individual owner may object, one owner’s
rights are subordinated to the will of the collective precisely because the
remaining owners have reliance interests in the enforcement of the
community scheme.69
There is, in effect, an assumption of risk that the rules could change.70
New rules might be adopted under existing board authority and, when
necessary, amendments may be made to the community’s governing
documents to expand or contract board authority, increasing or
decreasing the scope of the board’s rulemaking power.71 Both
expansions and contractions can affect property rights, because some
owners may buy into a community relying on the presence and
enforceability of existing restrictions, just as much as some might buy in
based on the absence of certain restrictions. The California Supreme
Court in Nahrstedt described this assumption of risk well when it quoted
Natelson’s observations that “owners associations ‘can be a powerful
force for good or for ill’ in their members’ lives;”72 and “anyone who
67. Levandusky v. One Fifth Ave. Apartment Corp., 75 N.Y.2d 530, 536 (N.Y. 1990) (“owners
consent to be governed, in certain respects, by the decisions of a board” and “such governing boards are
responsible for running the day-to-day affairs of the cooperative and to that end, often have broad
powers in areas that range from financial decisionmaking to promulgating regulations”).
68. Levandusky, 75 N.Y.2d at 536.
69. As one Florida court explained:
[S]trict enforcement of the restrictions of an association’s private constitution,
that is, its declaration of condominium, protects the members’ reliance interests in
a document which they have knowingly accepted, and accomplishes the desirable
goal of “allowing the establishment of, and subsequently protecting the integrity
of, diverse types of private residential communities, [thus providing] genuine
choice among a range of stable living arrangements.”
Aquarian Found., Inc. v. Sholom House, Inc., 448 So. 2d 1166, 1168 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (quoting
Robert Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1519, 1527 (1982)).
70. Villa De Las Palmas Homeowners Assn. v. Terifaj, 33 Cal. 4th 73, 85 (2004) (“A
prospective homeowner who purchases property in a common interest development should be aware
that new rules and regulations may be adopted by the homeowners association either through the
board’s rulemaking power or through the association’s amendment powers.”).
71. Id.
72. Nahrstedt, supra note 59 (citing Robert G. Natelson, Consent, Coercion, and
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buys a unit in a common interest development with knowledge of its
owners association’s discretionary power accepts ‘the risk that the
power may be used in a way that benefits the commonality but harms
the individual.’”73
When an owner purchases units subject to a declaration that can be
amended so long as certain procedures are followed, they are on notice
of the possible change and face a high hurdle to challenge a change that
should have been foreseeable as somehow contrary to their rights.74
Property owners are willing to live with the uncertainty of changing
rules and the possibility of amendments to declarations or bylaws (i.e.
are willing to give up some certainty and predictability in how they can
use their property) in order to get the benefits of the community. They
accept the risk of change. They know in advance that the rules might
change and that they are often subjecting themselves to the will of the
majority in an HOA.
The question, though, is determining the breadth of that agreement
and the scope of anticipated interference. While property owners agree
to allow changes in rules, property owners in HOAs expect the changes
to go only so far.75 The next Part in this Article will show some specific
“Reasonableness” In Private Law: The Special Case of The Property Owners Association, 51 OHIO ST.
L.J. 41, 43 (1990)).
73. Id. (citing Natelson, supra note 72, at 67).
74. Woodside Vill. Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Jahren, 806 So. 2d 452, 460-61 (Fla. 2002) (“we find
that respondents were on notice that the unique form of ownership they acquired when they purchased
their units in the Woodside Village Condominium was subject to change through the amendment
process, and that they would be bound by properly adopted amendments.”) The Woodside opinion has a
useful string of citations in it on this concept:
See Kroop v. Caravelle Condo., Inc., 323 So.2d 307, 309 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975)
(upholding restriction limiting leasing to once during ownership where
condominium owner acquired unit with knowledge that the declaration might
thereafter be lawfully amended); see also Ritchey v. Villa Nueva Condo. Ass’n,
81 Cal.App.3d 688, 146 Cal.Rptr. 695, 700 (1978) (noting that declaration
provided bylaws could be amended and that purchaser would be subject to any
reasonable amendment properly adopted); McElveen-Hunter v. Fountain Manor
Ass’n, Inc., 96 N.C.App. 627, 386 S.E.2d 435, 436 (1989), aff’d, 328 N.C. 84,
399 S.E.2d 112 (1991) (noting that plaintiff acquired her units subject to the right
of other owners to restrict their occupancy through properly enacted amendments
to the declaration); Worthinglen Condo. Unit Owners’ Ass’n v. Brown, 57 Ohio
App.3d 73, 566 N.E.2d 1275, 1277 (1989) (stating that purchasers of
condominium units should realize that the regime in existence at the time of
purchase may not continue indefinitely and that changes in the declaration may
take the form of restrictions on the unit owners’ use of their property); cf. Burgess
v. Pelkey, 738 A.2d 783, 789 (D.C.1999) (stating unit owner was on notice at
time of purchase of the possibility that his rights in the cooperative could be
affected by subsequent changes in the cooperative’s bylaws and house rules).
Woodside Vill. Condo. Ass’n., 806 So. 2d at 461.
75. NATELSON, supra note 3, at § 3.1 (association gets its power from declaration and founding
documents and cannot exercised powers not conferred). Courts also examine the exercise of rules by
boards and community amendments under a variety of tests, including looking at compliance with
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applications of these tests in relation to short term rental rules and
amendments. Homeowners must be able to anticipate possible changes
in HOA declarations and bylaws before it can be said that they
consented to new restrictive authority purportedly created after they
joined.76 Changes must be consistent with expectations. Owners should
be able to predict how the rules might change—to identify a foreseeable
bandwidth of available options for altering their usage rights. If a rule
or even a declaration or bylaw change goes too far, then it is not
authorized.
V. THE TREATMENT OF SHORT TERM RENTALS UNDER COMMON
INTEREST COMMUNITY AND HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATION GOVERNANCE
RULES AND PROCEDURES
While there are many cases addressing whether individual owners
subject to certain covenants may engage in short term rental operations
dating back decades,77 and while “boarding” is an age-old property
concept,78 the sharing economy boom is bringing heightened attention to
permission issues, including how CC&Rs should work in relation to
homeowners rights to include. These cases are highly fact-specific and
language dependent, often turning on interpretations of the restrictions,
of the rights of owners, and of the authorities granted HOAs in
governing documents.
Of course, if an owner buys into a common interest community where
a prohibition on, or the authority to, regulate short term rentals is already
clearly and expressly included in the agreement, then they have
consented to that substantive limitation on rights—subject, of course, to
procedures laid out in the governing bylaws, a reasonableness standard upon application of authority,
and the business judgment rule for certain decisions. “Certainly, the association is not at liberty to adopt
arbitrary or capricious rules bearing no relationship to the health, happiness and enjoyment of life of the
various unit owners.” Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Norman, 309 So. 2d 180, 182 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1975) (“If a rule is reasonable the association can adopt it; it not, it cannot. It is not necessary that
conduct be so offensive as to constitute a nuisance in order to justify regulation thereof.”); see also
Levandusky v. One Fifth Ave. Apartment Corp., 75 N.Y.2d 530, 537 (N.Y. 1990) (an exemplar for the
application of the business judgment rule). A full explication of those standards of review for the
exercise of authority—as distinguished from scope of authority—is beyond the scope of this Article.
76. NATELSON, supra note 3, at §2.5 (“In construing the effect of a subdivision declaration, it
frequently is necessary to determine the scope of the servitudes the declaration contains.”).
77. See, e.g., Yogman v. Parrott, 921 P.2d 1352, 1353 (Or. Ct. App. 1996) (STRs were not
“nonresidential” nor “commercial” in violation of subdivision covenants); Miesch v. Ocean Dunes
Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., 464 S.E.2d 64, 66, 68 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995) (HOA did not have authority to
impose maintenance assessment and user fees on short term renters because it violates express rights of
unit owners who rent to such short term renters).
78. See generally, e.g., WENDY GAMBER, THE BOARDINGHOUSE IN NINETEENTH CENTURY
AMERICA (2007); Ruth Graham, Boardinghouses: Where the City was Born, BOSTON GLOBE (Jan. 13,
2013),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2013/01/13/boardinghouses-where-city-wasborn/Hpstvjt0kj52ZMpjUOM5RJ/story.html.
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other rules of reasonableness and general limits on governance
authorities. In fact, many new neighborhoods are realizing the need to
be intentional in drafting to make sure their declaration reflects whether
the community supports or shuns homesharing.79
This Article focuses only on whether provisions in agreements are
interpreted to allow prohibition or limitation of short term rentals at all,
aside from how such authority could be exercised if it indeed exists
within the scope of possible restrictions.80 The latter issues are no doubt
important and consider, for example, questions like whether the exercise
of authority is reasonable, appropriate, in good faith, or the exercise of
sound business judgment.81 Nonetheless, those standards of review
regarding the exercise of proper substantive authority are mostly beyond
the scope of this Article.
The primary questions discussed in this Part relate to whether, when,
and how an association can impose limitations or prohibitions on short
term rentals under existing authorities where such express substantive
authority is not clearly, expressly given. These situations involve
whether HOAs may adopt rules relating to short term rentals through
previously granted authority to promote residential and single family
uses or to control against transient or commercial uses, for example; or,
alternatively, whether and how a community might vote to amend its
declaration to expand HOA authority so that it more clearly reaches
authorization to control short term rentals and homesharing activities.
As to the former, many courts have found that HOAs cannot fit square
pegs into round holes, instead requiring that the hole be altered through
properly completed amendment procedures.82
A large number of cases have found that, as traditionally written,
79. See, e.g., Brian Eason, Homeowners Associations Clamp Down on Rentals, USA TODAY
(Oct. 4, 2012, 9:17 PM), (“Most of the covenants for brand new neighborhoods within the last few years
have leasing restrictions”), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2012/10/04/homeownersoppose-rentals/1614229/.
80. NATELSON, supra note 3, at §4.2 ((1) ordinary HOA rules must find the affirmative source of
their authority in the founding documents like the declaration; and then (2) the exercise of that authority
must also be reasonable; and (3) the means “must not offend any provision in the declaration or other
documents of superior force”).
81. Franzese, supra note 48, at 666, 676-96 (explaining that the exercise of authority even when
within scope of available restrictions must still be tested, for example, under standards of
reasonableness, appropriateness, good faith, and business judgment).
82. See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Chiwawa Cmty’s. Ass’n, 327 P.3d 614, 616 (Wash. 2014) (en banc)
(interpreting covenants as not prohibiting short term rentals and holding that an amendment prohibiting
STRs would require unanimous approval because not related to existing covenants); Houston v. Wilson
Mesa Ranch Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., 360 P.3d 255 (Colo. Ct. App. 2015) (if association wants to
prohibit short term rentals, it needed more than simple procedural amendments); Estates at Desert Ridge
Trails Homeowners Ass’n v. Vazquez, 300 P.3d 736 (N.M. Ct. App. 2013) (if community wanted to bar
short term rentals, because authority did not exist under “residential use” limitation, an amendment to
declaration would be necessary).
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many CC&Rs do not prohibit short term rentals or should be interpreted
as allowing them—because they lack direct language prohibiting short
term rentals,83 include language allowing leasing but without time
specifications,84 have limits on using property only for “residential
use,”85 limit usage to “single family homes,”86 require usage be noncommercial or non-business,87 prohibit transient use,88 and the like, or at
least because they are ambiguous as to whether the CC&Rs limit or

83. See, e.g., Grave de Peralta v. Blackberry Mountain Ass’n, Inc., 726 S.E.2d 789 (Ga. Ct. App.
2012) (where covenants were silent on rentals, STR limits not valid).
84. See, e.g., Dawson v. Holiday Pocono Civic Ass’n, Inc., 36 Pa. D. & C. 5th 449 (Common
Pleas Pa. 2014) (residential use is “not restricted owner-occupied residential use” and the express
authority to “lease” was not limited in duration, so short term rental allowed); see also Friedman v.
Rozzlle, No. 13-12-00779-CV, 2013 WL 6175318 (Tex. Ct. App., Nov. 21, 2013) (community
homeowners acquiescence in short term rentals in community for 19 years amounted to abandonment of
restriction making the prohibition unenforceable).
85. See, e.g., Dunn v. Aamodt, 695 F.3d 797, 800 (8th Cir. 2012) (“residential purpose” phrase
in covenants was ambiguous so would not be interpreted to preclude STRs); Applegate v. Colucci, 908
N.E.2d 1214, 1216 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (STRs were “residential use”); Lowden v. Bosley, 909 A.2d
261, 262 (Md. 2006) (residential purposes covenant did not preclude short term rental).
86. See, e.g., Houston v. Wilson Mesa Ranch Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., 360 P.3d 255, 256-58
(Colo. Ct. App. 2015) (short term rentals can be considered “residential” under covenants, “commercial
use” prohibition in covenants does not preclude short term rentals, and mere procedural amendments
invalid to allow imposition of fines for STRs was invalid); Estates at Desert Ridge Trails Homeowners
Ass’n v. Vazquez, 300 P.3d 736, 738, 744,, 748 (N.M. Ct. App. 2013) (“residential purpose” limitation
did not bar short term rentals and general rulemaking authority of association could not extend to
restricting rental activity, meaning only unanimous approval for amendment would accomplish same);
Mason Family Trust v. Devaney, 207 P.3d 1176, 1179 (N.M. Ct. App. 2009) (“dwelling purposes only”
covenant that also prohibited business or commercial purposes did not preclude dwelling-based STRs);
see also Tarr v. Timberwood Park Owners Ass’n, Inc., 556 S.W.3d 274 (Texas 2018) (neither “single
family residence” nor “residential use” limitation in subdivision lot deed precluded short term rentals).
For a similar result under that term in zoning, see Heef Realty & Investments LLP v. City of Cedarburg
Board of Appeals, 861 N.W.2d 797, 798 (Wis. Ct. App. 2015) (“single family residential” zoning
permitted short term rental). But see In re Miller, 482 A.2d 688, 692 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1984) (boarding
home violated single family residence zoning).
87. See, e.g., Vera Angel Revocable Trust v. O’Bryant, 537 S.W.3d 254 (Ark. 2018) (prohibition
on “commercial use” in subdivision restrictive covenant not specific enough to preclude usage for short
term rentals.); Slaby v. Mountain River Estates Residential Ass’n, Inc., 100 So. 3d 569, 580, 582 (Ala.
Civ. App. 2012) (neither single family residence limit nor prohibition on commercial uses in covenants
precluded short term rentals). For a similar result interpreting these terms in zoning, see Siwinski v.
Town of Ogden Dunes, 922 N.E.2d 751 755 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (short term rental was not a
“commercial use” in violation of zoning ordinance). But see Vonderhaar v. Lakeside Place
Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., No. 2012-CA-002193-MR, 2014 WL 3887913, at *10-13 (Ky. Ct. App. Aug.
8, 2014) (STRs, akin to hotels or motels, are a prohibited business use under the covenants, especially
where declared as business for tax purposes).
88. See, e.g., Ross v. Bennett, 203 P.3d 383, 384 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008) (short term rentals, less
than 30 days, were considered under covenants to be a permitted residential use and not a prohibited
business use). But see S. Ridge Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Brown, 226 P.3d 758 (Utah Ct. App. 2010)
(weekly rentals violated restrictions on “nightly” rentals and “timeshares” in covenants); Monarch Point
Homeowners Ass’n v. Arditi, No. G040668, 2009 WL 1838286, at *1-3 (June 26, 2009) (prohibition on
“transient or hotel purposes” was properly interpreted in clarifying addendum as including the authority
for the HOA to prohibit short term rentals less than 30 days).
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prohibit short term rentals.89 In each of these situations, the “right to
share” through short term rentals has usually been found present as
surviving the initial agreement and protected when associations have
attempted to claim violations of the governing rules and charge
assessments for their alleged violation.
Gadd v. Hensley,90 a March 2017 case from the Court of Appeals of
Kentucky—is a good example of such a common resolution, interpreting
HOA rules to allow short term rentals. In Gadd, the court examined
deed restrictions in a subdivision and found ambiguities that led it to
conclude that short term rentals were not prohibited. The subdivision
deeds in question allowed rentals but without specifying any length
restriction.91 The developer nonetheless tried to curtail the rights of
Gadd to enter into short term rentals by claiming that the “single family
residential use purposes” clause somehow modified the leasing clause to
prohibit short term rentals.92 The trial court granted summary judgment
for the developer.93 The court of appeals, though, reversed the lower
court’s grant of summary judgment, holding that the deeds were
insufficiently clear to limit the rights of owners to engage in short
duration rentals.94
The court of appeals concluded that it was clear that the “language of
the restrictive deed does not prevent Gadd from renting his property on a
short term basis” because “[w]hen language is ambiguous [the court] is
not permitted to constrain the free exercise of a property owner’s use of
property.”95 In particular, the court reasoned, “Clearly, Gadd’s ability to
rent his home for any length of time, short or long, supports his, the
homeowner’s, unrestricted use of the property. This interpretation
protects the property owner.”96 Gadd represents an informative,
straightforward interpretation of the typical covenant language regarding
“residential” or “single family” uses or purposes. Those provisions
usually do not prohibit short term rentals—due in part to the courts
putting a thumb on the scale of homeowners’ rights to exercise their
property rights if not clearly abdicated by agreement, including the right
89. See, e.g., Scott v. Walker, 645 S.E.2d 278, 279 (Va. 2007) (ambiguous covenants must be
interpreted in favor of free use of property and against restrictions so short term rental was allowed).
But see Tarr v. Timberwood Park Owners Association, Inc., 510 S.W.3d 725, 731-32 (Tex. Ct. App.
2016) (in a split with other Texas courts, holding restrictive covenant barred short term rentals within
CIC).
90. Nos. 2015-CA-001948-MR, 2016-CA-000164-MR, 2017 WL 1102982 (Ky. Ct. App. March
24, 2017).
91. Id. at *6-7.
92. Id. at *7.
93. Id. at *3.
94. Id. at *14, 16-18.
95. Id. at *17.
96. Id. at *16.
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to include. The court’s holding in Gadd is consistent with the idea that
the right to share exists and the courts will presume that it has not been
given over to the association to restrict when express provisions do not
encompass such an alienation of control and when homeowners could
not anticipate in the agreement that they would be so restricted.
Of course, we know from precedent and experience regarding CICs
and HOAs that rules can be changed.97 Further, as Part IV explained,
owners’ rights to object to such changes are somewhat limited because
they entered into community association agreements understanding that
certain rights could be curtailed in the future. There are generally two
categories of options for expanding community governance to preclude
or limit short term rentals—changes to rules via ordinary course and
changes to declarations or bylaws under prescribed extraordinary
(usually super-majority) procedures.98 Several recent cases have found
that the former category of authority is not sufficiently broad in scope to
allow the imposition of new restrictions on short term rentals not readily
anticipated by existing declarations. Several recent cases have also
found, however, that substantive changes in declarations or bylaws have
a much wider berth within which to expand restrictions on owners’
bundles of rights precisely because owners pre-committed to accept
such changes provided extraordinary procedures precede their adoption
and application.
A March 2017 case from New York is illustrative of the point that
ordinary association rule changes by the board alone cannot accomplish
the imposition of restrictions on short term rentals that would otherwise
be authorized under existing rights. In Matter of Olszewski v. Cannon
Point Association, Inc.,99 the New York Supreme Court Appellate
Division examined condominium bylaws that granted homeowners the
right to convey or lease his or her home “free of any restrictions.”100
The court held that such language defining the homeowners rights
would be rendered meaningless when an HOA board of directors adopts
rules imposing numerous limitations on homeowners’ rental of their
property.101 Thus, in the case, the court impliedly equated short term
rentals to “leases”102 and refused enforcement of the restrictions on short
97. NATELSON, supra note 3, at §2.4.
98. Id. §3.3.2.1.
99. 148 A.D.3d 1306 (N.Y. App. Div. March 9, 2017).
100. Id. at 1308.
101. Id. at 1310.
102. There is some remaining debate over whether a short term rental as usually transacted in
today’s sharing economy, such as through Airbnb, constitutes a “lease” in the legal sense that term is
usually given in the context of property law, or whether it is a “lease” only in the more colloquial sense.
A court concerned with such a distinction would need to evaluate whether the use of that term “lease” in
an HOA or CIC document has a particular meaning and whether short term rentals fit into the
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term rentals.103 However, at the end of its opinion, the court counseled
that the association could—through proper procedures—amend the
bylaws. As the court in Olszewski explained that, because the
homeowners “expressly were granted the right to lease their properties
free of any restrictions,” then “to the extent that [the community
members] wish to impose rules in this area, they may do so—but only if
the rules so adopted do not in fact conflict with the rights and privileges
conveyed to petitioners (and similarly situated homeowners) pursuant to
the relevant provisions of the bylaws.”104 If the rules adopted conflict
with rights granted, as they did under the facts in Olszewski, the
community members could instead “successfully avail themselves of the
procedures set forth in the declarations and bylaws relative to the
amendment thereof.”105 The court further noted that the HOA should
“persuade the required percentage of each association’s
homeowners/members as to the merit of their position and amend the
bylaws accordingly” if indeed the community members believed that the
injury from the short term rentals was so substantial as to require a
remedy.106 Nevertheless, the court reiterated that this more difficult
avenue of change was required because “[a]bsent appropriate
amendment to the relevant governing documents, however, the 2014
rules constitute an impermissible exercise of [the association’s]
powers.”107
What might be called an “anti-shoehorning” rationale in Olszewski
mirrors the rationale adopted in another very recent case regarding
zoning boards and their authority to impose new zoning restrictions on
short term rentals. Although public regulatory controls are largely
beyond the scope of this Article, a brief aside into that area is useful to
flag some of the parallel discussions. In a February 2017 opinion, the
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania in Shvekh v. Zoning Hearing
Board of Stroud Township108 held that even though a zoning board’s
interpretation of its own ordinance is entitled to deference, it “cannot
advance a new and strained interpretation of its zoning ordinance in
order to effect what it would like the ordinance to say without an
amendment.”109 The court explained that the zoning board could not
documents’ definition of “lease” or “sublease.” The court in Olszewski did not seem to see a need to
draw a distinction. Such matters of interpretation of the term “lease” will undoubtedly become
important in these HOA STR cases, but those subjects of inquiry are beyond the scope of this Article.
103. Olszewski, 148 A.D.3d at 1311.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. 154 A.3d 408 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Feb. 6, 2017).
109. Id. at 414.
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stretch its ordinance on “tourist homes” to encompass short term rentals
of private residences, cautioning that “amendments cannot be effected
by shoehorning a use that involves renting an entire single-family home
to vacationers into the definition of ‘tourist home.’”110 If the zoning
board wanted authority for that interpretation, the court admonished the
board to seek an amendment to the ordinance instead.
Despite the owner-protective ruling in Olszewski, we must remember
that these cases turn on interpretations of words. The cases are factspecific and often depend on the presence or absence of language in the
restrictions and in the language of the governing documents. Consider a
different case with different declarations and bylaws leading to a
different conclusion. In Watts v. Oak Shores Community Association,111
the California Court of Appeal in 2015 held that “homeowners
associations may adopt reasonable rules and impose fees on members
relating to short-term rentals of condominium units.”112 The court
interpreted broadly the bylaws granting wide authority to adopt rules,
including the power to adopt rules to protect quiet enjoyment—in light
of evidence presented that showed that short term renters cause more
problems and impose more costs than community owners impose.113 It
explained that the “powers to adopt rules” includes rules for addressing
such concerns even when they limit owners’ control over their
property.114 Thus, while the court did not reject that there may be a right
to share and that right may include the right to create short term rentals,
when the owners do not preserve strong protections for their rights and
concurrently confer broad authority by agreement to restrict those rights
for the greater good of the community, then those owners cannot be said
to complain if the broad power is exercised broadly. How the balance is
drafted in the governing agreement can make a substantial difference.
Note that in the Watts case the court was confronted with a grant of
authority, yet made no discussion of the existence of a concomitant
broad grant of rights to be free from restrictions like seen in Olszewski.
The absence of such a countervailing right allowed the court in Watts to
construe the power to adopt rules more expansively. If the HOA’s
authority is written broadly enough and does not constrain the
association from imposing short-term rental restrictions through rules,
Watts illustrates the possibility that courts may uphold such boardinitiated actions.
As explained in Part IV, the unique thing about the HOA short term
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 415.
235 Cal. App.4th 466 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015).
Id. at 468.
Id. at 473.
Id.
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rental cases is that an owner’s expectations include the possibility of
change; rights to do something now do not always last in perpetuity if
(1) the HOA substantive rulemaking authority is broad enough to allow
changes or new rules through ordinary procedures designed to carry out
existing mandates; or (2) the governing declarations or bylaws permit
amendments to the HOA’s substantive rulemaking authority and
mandates. Change can be done with normal rulemaking in that first
category, but cases like Olszewski illustrate the difficulties in doing so if
there is not an express category of HOA authority with a broad enough
scope to attack the issue at hand, i.e. if the existing authority is not wide
enough that the owners could have anticipated the possibility of a rule
against short term rentals as being encompassed within its scope.
Allowable residential and single family home purposes are usually
interpreted to allow short term rentals, so those types of provisions are
insufficient to curtail inclusion rights. There would need to be language
that creates a foreseeable expectation of short term rental limitations that
would allow an owner ex ante to anticipate the possibility their rights to
engage in short term rentals would be precluded. The interpretive rules
are designed to allow the owners to make informed choices to enter into
the CIC agreement reasonably able to foresee the consequences of
ceding certain property rights to the authority of the community’s
governing entities.
The fact that a community’s constitution, bylaws, or declarations can
be changed, however, is important. Simply by agreeing to enter into a
common interest community (including agreeing to give the CIC the
power to liberally amend its primary governing documents)—and
thereby assuming the risk that such amendments could include
substantial limitations on the property owner’s rights as a result of
(usually) supermajority choice—a homeowner is agreeing forever to a
somewhat indeterminate bundle of sticks.115 They are, in effect,
agreeing that rights that may exist when they move in (such as to enter
into short term rentals) may not last forever and could be curtailed
without standing to complain.
A very instructive case on these principles of governance
amendments is Adams v. Kimberley One Townhouse Owner’s
Association, Inc., from the Idaho Supreme Court in June 2015.116 In
2003, Virgil Adams purchased a lot in a subdivision, subject to CC&Rs
115. See, e.g., Filmor LLLP v. Unit Owners Ass’n of Centre Pointe Condominium, 333 P.3d 498,
508 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014) (interpreting legislation on condo units to require a 90 percent vote to amend
declaration or bylaws to impose leasing restrictions including because that interpretation “protects the
reasonable and settled expectations of unit owners who purchased their units under the original
declaration and advances the legislature’s intent to provide additional consumer protection to
condominium purchasers”).
116. 352 P.3d 492 (Idaho 2015).
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contained in a 1980 declaration which included provisions allowing for
subsequent amendments to the declaration by a 2/3 vote of the
subdivision lot owners.117 In 2012, Adams began entering into shortterm rental agreements for his property.118 In 2013, after numerous
complaints about the behavior of various short term renters using
Adams’s property, the 1980 declaration was amended by requisite
supermajority vote to change the permitted use of subdivision lots.119
Among other things, the 2013 amendments required board approval of
rental documents and advertisements along with the prohibition of both
subleases and rentals for fewer than six months.120 After Adams
continued to enter into short term rentals in defiance of the 2013
amendments, the board enacted house rules to impose penalties for each
day a unit was rented ($300/day fine) or advertised ($100/day fine) in
violation.121 Adams then brought a declaratory judgment action seeking
to invalidate the 2013 amendments.122 The district court granted
summary judgment to the Association, upholding the validity of the
2013 amendments.123 The Idaho supreme court affirmed.
The court held that the modifications in the 2013 amendments were
not “new” unknown burdens added to the CC&Rs, but instead that they
were anticipated within the broad amendment authority granted in the
1980 declaration. It further held that Adams was both subject to such
restrictions and should have been aware of the possibility of such
restrictions being imposed upon purchase, i.e., no legitimate reliance
interests were affected.124 After identifying a split of authority among
the states as to whether a new restriction on rental activity may be
reasonably added under a general amendment provision or whether a
new restriction is per se unreasonable, the supreme court found Idaho’s
approach to CC&R amendments more consistent with the line of cases
that adopt a case-by-case approach rather than a per se prohibition.125
The court explained that while some amendments may go “too far” in
changing the nature of original restrictions, the restrictions in this case
did not do so.126 In fact, it explained that changes to CC&Rs should be
liberally permitted under a general amendment provision and parties to
CC&Rs should be bound by even significant future alterations unless an
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. at 494 n. 2.
Id. at 494.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 495-99.
Id. at 496-98.
Id. at 497-98.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018

27

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 1

920

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 86

amendment term produces an unconscionable result.127 According to
the court in the Adams case, the 2013 amendments simply narrowed
what may be considered a “single family residential purpose” to reflect
the long-term and stable occupancy implied by that condition on lot use
“rather than it being used as a hotel as Adams had.”128
In March 2017, the California Court of Appeal in Ocean Windows
Owners Association v. Spataro (a non-citable, “not officially published”
opinion),129 we see another application of the fact-specific or languagespecific approach. In Ocean Windows, the HOA had asked the lower
court to grant a petition that would allow approval of changes to its
CC&R’s by a reduced voting percentage of its members.130 The
proposed amendments were aimed at preventing short term and
weekend rentals that many in the association had come to see as
problematic—due to increased costs to the association due to trash
pickup, security, project management, damage to common areas and the
like.131 The proposed amendments got only 71%, not the 75%
supermajority required to pass under their bylaws.132 Thus, the HOA
petition to amend by a lower percentage of approving owners upon court
approval (available to it by statute) followed. The lower court granted
the petition. The property owner aggrieved by the new rule argued that
the lower court abused its discretion—not because there were any
procedural errors in the vote but based instead on a claim that there was
not a sufficient showing that the amendments were “necessary” for the
good of the community, something she claimed was a required element
to grant these petitions to allow reduced voting percentages by statutory
right.133 The Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court, and in so doing
rejected the property owner’s definition of the standard, explaining that
the proposed amendments need only be “reasonable” to qualify for the
granting of a petition.134 Moreover, after identifying substantial
evidence in the record, the Court of Appeal held that the proposed new
restrictions were, indeed, reasonable in light of injury caused the
community from short term rentals and the lower court properly

127. Id. at 498.
128. Id. For a similar recent case where the court has enforced a properly enacted Declaration
Amendment with the requisite number of homeowners in a community voting to adopt the change in the
restrictions to include prohibitions on short term rentals, see North Country Properties, LLC v. Lost
Acres Homeowners Association of Burnett, 879 N.W.2d 810 (Wis. Ct. App. March 22, 2016).
129. No. D066852, 2017 WL 1075056 (Cal. Ct. App. March 22, 2017).
130. Id. at *3-5.
131. Id. at *10, *14.
132. Id. at *9-10.
133. Id. at *12-13.
134. Id. at *2.
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exercised its broad discretion when granting the petition.135
These lines of cases are consistent with the general rules interpreting
the consent to be governed and owners’ acceptance of restrictions on
property rights in common interest communities. So much depends on
the language of the instruments of agreement.136 Homeowners joining
common interest communities are presumed to come to the agreement
table having the right to enter into short term rentals of their property.
This sharing right is presumed to survive the agreement to be governed
by community rules unless there is some evidence in the agreement to
the contrary. Nonetheless, most CICs also allow for relatively liberal
amendments to their governing documents. Unless the amendment
authority is sufficiently limited in scope, restrictions on short term
rentals are very likely to be upheld within the scope of allowable
amendments.
If homeowners wish to provide armor against amendments that would
curtail such rights, express limits on the substantive scope of
amendment authority rather than simply procedural protections of
supermajority rules should be included within the language of the
bylaws. Conversely, associations that wish to have the authority to
impose rules can learn from these cases that the governing documents
should be drafted broadly enough in the first instance to confer such
power to prohibit or regulate short term rentals. If they are not, then
such associations or members in the community wishing to limit short
term rentals should seek to amend the declarations or bylaws and
declaration to permit such broader authority.
Finally, associations and homeowners should be aware of and, if
desired, responsive to, creative rule circumvention techniques.
Remember, drafting with precision matters and drafting in anticipation
of creative ways to skirt the rules can be equally important. For
example, one recent report warned associations that “governing
documents [even when they include restrictions on short-term rentals]
may not be adequate enough to prevent the savvy owner from taking
advantage of potential ambiguities.”137 This attorney explained that
homeowners will get creative when they need to: “For example, if an
owner can obtain a one-year lease from a short-term renter that provides
for early termination with no penalty, the owner is then able to provide a
valid lease agreement to the association, effectively providing a short135. Id. at *15.
136. Franzese, supra note 48, at 672 (“As to the former means of imposing restrictions, the
CC&R or ‘Declaration of Condominium’ is the community’s master document”).
137. Theresa L. Donovan, Does your Community Association have sufficient protections in place
for Short-Term Vacation Rentals?, THE CONDO AND HOA LAW BULLETIN (Apr. 17, 2017),
https://thecondoandhoalawbulletin.com/2017/04/17/short-term-rentals/.
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term lease disguised as a long-term lease.”138 When language matters,
cases can turn on what is stated and, critically sometimes, what is not
stated—with the latter having particular importance when interpretive
rules tend to favor property rights, erring on the side of protecting
homeowner uses not expressly prohibited.
VI. CONCLUSION
The reason for the presumptions seen in the cases evaluated in this
Article, and the explanation for why some methods work to curtail short
term rental rights while others do not, rest again on the right to include
and the subcategory within it that is the right to share. Because it is a
stick in the property owner’s bundle of rights, the sharing branch
stemming off the inclusion stick will presumptively survive an owner’s
agreement to enter into a common interest community. It will only be
abrogated upon identifiable language in the initial agreement making
such diminishment of the right possible. Such authority in the initial
declaration might confer upon the HOA the power to curtail the
homesharing right from the outset, or it might only be limited after
amendment procedures create such authority to control the sharing right,
with such amendments being made pursuant to the homeowner’s
consent to such future alterations in the balance between her rights and
the association’s authority. In other words, an owner’s rights to engage
in short term rentals may become limited if an owner agreed to give up
perpetual control of the sharing stick when they entered the common
interest community, but not before they have done so.

138. Id.
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